Past Issues

Philosophy of Mind

European Review of Philosophy 1 (1994)

Gianfranco Soldati (ed.)

International philosophical debate in Europe until recently has often been confined within national borders.
volume 1
A new generation of philosophers, committed to restore a tradition of rigorous philosophical argumentation, is growing. European Review of Philosophy, an annual publication, is intended to offer them a place for communication and debate. It is meant to become their instrument of intellectual exchange. It primarily aims at authors not yet established in the philosophical circuit, working on a wide range of topics. This first volume contains a main thematical part with papers in the philosophy of mind addressing issues such as self-deception, other minds, qualia, and cognitive science. Volumes on other topics, such as the philosophy of language, and the philosophy of law, will follow.

Table of contents

Mario Alai
Brains in Vat and Their Minds

Alex Burry & Stephan Furrer
Truth and Knowledge of Other Minds

Alexander Bird
Rationality and the Structure of Self-Deception

Paul Castell
Moore’s Paradox and Partial Belief

Ronald L. Chrisley
The Ontological Status of Computational States

Michael Loughlin
Against Qualia: Our Direct Perception of Physical Reality

Adriano P. Palma
Hopes and Doubts

Daniel Seymour
The de re/de dicto Distinction: A Plea for Cognitive Science

ISBN (Cloth) 1-881526-53-4
ISBN (Paper) 1-881526-38-0

Cognitive Dynamics

European Review of Philosophy 2 (1996)

Jérôme Dokic (ed.)

volume 2

 

The theme of this volume is cognitive dynamics, which was coined by David Kaplan in his classical work
“Demonstratives”.

The contributors touch on important requirements on the theory of cognitive dynamics such as, the presence of change of mind, the question of the
relative priority of the theories of thought and language, and changes in context and content.

 

 

Table of contents

Jérôme Dokic
Introduction

John Perry
Rip van Winkle and Other Characters

François Recanati
The Dynamics of Situations

Michael Luntley
Dynamic Thoughts and Empty Minds

Maite Ezcurdia
Dynamic and Coherent Thoughts

Cristoph Hoerl
Cognitive Dynamics: An Attempt at Changing Your Mind

Tobies Grimaltos & Carlos J. Moya
Belief, Content, and Cause

Alberto Voltolini
Critical Notice of Francois Recanati’s Direct Reference

ISBN (Cloth) 1-57586-073-2
ISBN (Paper) 1-57586-072-4

Response-Dependence

European Review of Philosophy 3 (1998)

Roberto Casati & Christine Tappolet (eds.)

Some concepts, such as colour concepts or value concepts, seem to bear traces of the mind’s own make-up. For instance, the
character of perceptually-determined colour concepts seems in some sense derivative from the character of the visual system.
volume 3
Thus, it has seemed plausible to claim that the corresponding colour properties are dispositions to elicit certain visual experiences in normal observers under suitable
conditions. Much the same has been suggested for value concepts. An extreme position would be that colours and values therefore are not in the
world at all, they instead are mere projections that tell us more about the users of response-dependent concepts than about the world they
inhabit. But even setting aside such extreme views, a number of important philosophical and psychological questions remain open. What exactly is response-dependence, and does any concept have this feature? What is the appropriate metaphysics for properties represented by response-dependent concepts, and for these concepts themselves? What determines the extension of such properties? How are we to account for knowledge expressed in terms of response-dependent concepts? What mechanisms correctly explain the origins of response-dependent concepts, and their role in representation? This volume brings together a wide range of views on these questions.

Table of contents

Mark Powell
Realism or Response Dependence?

Crispin Wright
Euthyphronism and the Physicality of Colour: A Comment on Mark Powell’s “Realism or Response-Dependence?”

Ralph Wedgwood
The Essence of Response-Dependence

Philip Pettit
Terms, Things and Response-Dependence

Peter Railton
Red, Bitter, Good

Michael Smith
Response-Dependence Without Reduction

Huw Price
Two Paths to Pragmatism

Jim Edwards
Response-Dependence, Kripke and Minimal Truth

Alexander Miller
Rule-Following, Response-Dependence, and McDowell’s Debate with Anti-Realism

Alex Byrne
Interpretivism

Alison Denham
Metaphor and Judgements of Experience

Peter Menzies
Possibility and Conceivability: A Response-Dependent Account of Their Connections

ISBN (Cloth) 1-57586-105-4
ISBN (Paper) 1-57586-104-6

The Nature of Logic

European Review of Philosophy 4 (1999)

Achille Varzi (ed.)

What is logic? What makes it a subject in its own right, separate from (and in the background of) the concerns of other
disciplines? What is
the distinctive character of a logical term or operation?

volume 4

 

The wealth of technical developments in all areas of logic in recent years has not diminished the need of serious philosophical reflection on the nature of logic, and indeed there is a growing gap between the logician’s work and the philosopher’s urge to understand the scope of that work. The aim of this collection is to offer material toward filling that gap.

Some of the essays have a programmatic flavor; others put forward articulated views; others still concern themselves with the link between
technical aspects and philosophical issues. But all share a common concern for the heart of the problem and stem from a common desire to
clarify the nature of the logician’s enterprise.

Table of contents

Achille Varzi
Introduction

Ermanno Bencivenga
What Is Logic About?

Johan van Benthem
Wider Still and Wider…Resetting the Bounds of Logic

Dirk van Dalen
The Intuitionistic Conception of Logic

Allen P. Hazen
Logic and Analyticity

Arnold Koslow
The Implicational Nature of Logic: A Structuralist Account

Manuel Perez-Otero & Manuel Garcia-Carpintero
The Ontological Commitments of Logical Theories

Graham Priest
Validity

Gila Sher
Is Logic a Theory of the Obvious?

ISBN (Cloth) 1-57586-179-8
ISBN (Paper) 1-57586-178-X

Emotion and Action

European Review of Philosophy 5 (2002)

Élisabeth Pacherie (ed.)

In recent years, there has been an explosion of interest in the study of emotion and cognition. Interdisciplinary work
on normal emotions and on ‘emotional disorders’ has led to a better appreciation of the complex nature of emotion and of the many
components involved in emotional processes.

volume 5As a result, the traditional philosophical prejudice against emotions, seen as essentially
irrational and disruptive, has been replaced by a more positive attitude towards them. The philosophical essays in this collection explore
various facets of the relationships among emotion, action, rationality, and self-knowledge. Three main sets of issues are addressed: the
relationships between emotions and action; the role emotion and action play in the development of self-awareness and in our knowledge of our
mental states; and the rationality of emotions and emotional action. This volume is a must-read for anyone interested in the important role
emotion plays in rational thought and action.

Table of contents

David Pears
Akrasia and the Power of Reason

Nico H. Frida
Emotions as Motivational States

Johannes Roessler
Action, Emotion, and the Development of Self-awareness

Élisabeth Pacherie
The Role of Emotions in the Explanation of Action

Pierre Livet
Emotions, Revision, and the Explanation of Emotional Actions

Stephane Lemaire
From Emotions to Desires

Jerrold Levinson
Sound, Gesture, Spatial Imagination and the Expression of Emotion in Music

Christine Tappolet
Long-term Emotions and Emotional Experiences in the Explanation of Action

ISBN (Cloth) 1-57586-387-1
ISBN (Paper) 1-57586-388-X

The Structure of Nonconceptual Content

European Review of Philosophy 6 (2006)

Christine van Geen & Frédérique de Vignemont (eds.)

Guest authors:

  • Sonia Sedivy, University of Toronto
  • Michael Tye, University of Texas

Are all mental representations conceptual? Can concepts represent the fineness of grain of mental states such as emotions, bodily sensations and perceptual states? What is the nature of mental representations in non-linguistic and pre-linguistic creatures?

volume 6

 

The present volume tackles this debate by asking how far the analogy between the structure of conceptual and nonconceptual content can be carried. Should similarity in structure be assumed in order to explain how nonconceptual states are conceptualized? And conversely, how can nonconceptual content retain its specificity, if its structure matches that of conceptual representations?

By bringing together conceptualists and nonconceptualists, this volume aims to provide a detailed state of the art on this debate and to shed new light on an issue of particular interest for philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists.

Table of contents

Christine van Geen & Frédérique de Vignemont
Foreword

Michael Tye
The Thesis of Nonconceptual Content

Sonia Sedivy
Nonconceptual Epicycles

Manuel Garcia-Carpintero
Nonconceptual Modes of Presentation

Roblin Meeks
Why Nonconceptual Content cannot be Immune to Error Through Misidentification

Alison J. Creese & Julien A. Deonna
Les Liaisons Dangereuses or How not to Construe Nonconceptual Content

Paperback, 124 pages
ISBN-10: 1575865300
ISBN-13: 978-1575865300