The Structure of Nonconceptual Content

European Review of Philosophy 6 (2006)

Christine van Geen & Frédérique de Vignemont (eds.)

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Guest authors:

• Sonia Sedivy, University of Toronto
• Michael Tye, University of Texas

Are all mental representations conceptual? Can concepts represent the fineness of grain of mental states such as emotions, bodily sensations and perceptual states? What is the nature of mental representations in non-linguistic and pre-linguistic creatures?

The present volume tackles this debate by asking how far the analogy between the structure of conceptual and nonconceptual content can be carried. Should similarity in structure be assumed in order to explain how nonconceptual states are conceptualized? And conversely, how can nonconceptual content retain its specificity, if its structure matches that of conceptual representations?

By bringing together conceptualists and nonconceptualists, this volume aims to provide a detailed state of the art on this debate and to shed new light on an issue of particular interest for philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists.

Table of contents

Christine van Geen & Frédérique de Vignemont
Foreword

Michael Tye
The Thesis of Nonconceptual Content

Sonia Sedivy
Nonconceptual Epicycles

Manuel Garcia-Carpintero
Nonconceptual Modes of Presentation

Roblin Meeks
Why Nonconceptual Content cannot be Immune to Error Through Misidentification

Alison J. Creese & Julien A. Deonna
Les Liaisons Dangereuses or How not to Construe Nonconceptual Content

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The Structure of Nonconceptual Content can be ordered through your local bookstore, The University of Chicago Press, and Amazon.com.

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